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HARRIS v. ALABAMA: IS THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA ENTERING A FOURTH PHASE?
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Questions Presented by Harris v. Alabama
Petitioner, Louise Harris, was convicted of capital murder by an Alabama jury.
The same jury at the sentencing phase recommended life imprisonment by a vote of
seven to five. The trial judge disregarded the advisory jury verdict and sentenced the
petitioner to death by electrocution.' After all appeals at the state level were exhaust-
ed,2 the Supreme Court granted petitioner's motion for leave to proceed in forma pau-
peris and granted certiorari limited to the following questions:
QI. Is [the] death sentence invalid when [the] trial court overrides constitutionally
protected jury verdict of life without parole and imposes death, when court relies
on no norm or standard for limiting its discretion to override and when it gives no
reason as to why jury verdict is improper?
Q2. Does capital sentencing scheme in which trial courts are free to reject jury life-
without-parole verdicts without regard to any articulated standard or norm, and in
which rejection of those verdicts results in haphazard and inconsistent application
of death penalty, violate Eighth Amendment?3
B. Alabama's Death Penalty Scheme
Alabama law vests capital sentencing authority in the trial judge, but requires the
judge to consider an advisory jury verdict.4 One convicted of capital murder in Ala-
bama is entitled to a sentencing hearing before a jury,5 unless waived by both parties
with approval of the court.6 At the sentencing hearing statutory aggravating factors7
1. Harris v. State, 632 So. 2d 503 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).
2. Ex parte Harris, 632 So. 2d 543 (Ala. 1993).
3. Harris v. Alabama, 93-7659, 63 U.S.L.W. 3024 (July 19, 1994).
4. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(a) (1994).
5. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46 (1994).
6. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-44 (1994).
7. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49 (1994) states:
Aggravating circumstances shall be the following:
(1) The capital offense was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment;
(2) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital offense or a felony in-
volving the use or threat of violence to the person;
(3) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons;
(4) The capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged or was an ac-
complice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing, or
attempting to commit, rape, robbery, burglary, or kidnapping;
(5) The capital offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a law-
ful arrest or effecting an escape from custody;
(6) The capital offense was committed for pecuniary gain;
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must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and the state must disprove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence mitigating factors' proffered by the defendant.' The jury then
determines the advisory verdict. If the jury decides that aggravating factors, if any,
outweigh mitigating factors, then the jury recommends death; otherwise, the verdict is
life without parole."° A jury can recommend death only if ten jurors agree, life im-
prisonment requires only a majority vote.' The sentencing judge receives both the
verdict and the vote tally. The judge then considers all available evidence and files a
written statement detailing the defendant's crime, aggravating and mitigating factors,
and the sentence imposed. Alabama law provides as follows:
In deciding upon the sentence, the trial court shall determine whether the aggra-
vating circumstances it finds to exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances it finds
to exist, and in doing so the trial court shall consider the recommendation of the
jury contained in its advisory verdict, unless such a verdict has been waived pursu-
ant to Section 13A-5-46(a) or 13A-5-46(g). While the jury's recommendation con-
cerning sentence shall be given consideration, it is not binding upon the court.2
If the death sentence is imposed, the conviction and sentence are automatically re-
viewed by the appellate court, and if affirmed, an automatic writ of certiorari is grant-
ed by the Alabama Supreme Court. Additionally, when reviewing the record for errors,
.the appellate court must independently weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors
and also determine if the death sentence is disproportionate to sentences rendered in
comparable cases."
(7) The capital offense was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any
governmental function or the enforcement of laws; or
(8) The capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel compared to other
capital offenses.
8. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51 (1994) states:
Mitigating circumstances shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;
(2) The capital offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance;
(3) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to it;
(4) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital offense committed by another person
and his participation was relatively minor;
(5) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of
another person;
(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform to the requirements of law was substantially impaired; and
(7) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-52 (1994), further states:
In addition to the mitigating circumstances specified in Section 13A-5-51, mitigating
circumstances shall include any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of
the circumstances of the offense that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence of
life imprisonment without parole instead of death, and any other relevant mitigating
circumstance which the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence of life imprisonment
without parole instead of death.
9. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(g) (1994).
10. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e) (1994).
11. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(f) (1994).
12. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (1994) (emphasis added).
13. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53(b) (1994). See also Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995).
Harris v. Alabama
C. Standards Set by Other States
Only four states, Florida, Indiana, Delaware, and Alabama, use a trifurcated
system mandating the involvement of both jury and judge in their death penalty sen-
tencing scheme. 4 The supreme courts of Florida 5 and Indiana 6 have set standards
to regulate the roles of judge and jury. When the two (judge and jury) reach different
determinations about punishment, the function of the jury's life determination in the
final sentencing verdict is clear: the advisory life determination can be set aside only if
"the facts suggesting a sentence of death [are] so clear and convincing that virtually no
reasonable person could differ."' 7 Delaware has only recently required both jury and
judge participation in capital sentencing, but it appears to be adopting the "Tedder
standard" for governing disagreements between the two decisionmakers. There have
been no death sentences imposed under Delaware's new sentencing scheme after a
jury's life recommendation. 9 The Alabama Supreme Court has yet to set forth a dis-
tinct standard for judges when overriding a jury's recommendation."
This note will address the question of whether the Alabama death penalty
scheme, as presently formulated, violates the Eighth Amendment under the standards
set forth by the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia and related cases.2' Part II of this
note will discuss the Furman22 and Gregg23 decisions and their effect on state death
penalty schemes. Part III will examine the factual history of Harris, the Supreme
Court's decision, and the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens. Part IV will offer an
analysis of Harris and conclude with a brief summary of the major points covered in
this note.
H. THE FURMAN AND GREGG DECISIONS: THEIR MEANING AND EF-
FECT ON DEATH PENALTY SCHEMES IN AMERICA
A. Brief History of the Death Penalty in America
The death penalty in America has passed through roughly three broad phases. In
phase one, at the time of Independence, most felonies led to the imposition of the
death penalty. Most homicides and all murders were automatically punishable by death.
Gradually by the nineteenth century most states divided murder into two degrees, first
14. In a vast majority of states that employ the death penalty, juries determine the sentence, un-
less the defendant requests sentencing by the court. In Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska the
sentence is determined by the trial judge. Marcia A. Widder, Hanging Life in the Balance: The Su-
preme Court and the Metaphor of Weighing in the Penalty Phase of the Capital Trial, 68 TuL. L.
REv. 1341, 1342 n.6 (1994) [hereinafter Widder].
15. See Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
16. See Martinez-Chavez v. State, 534 N.E.2d 731, 735 (Ind. 1989).
17. See Tedder, 322 So. 2d at 910; see also Martinez-Chavez, 534 N.E.2d at 735 ("In order to
sentence a defendant to death after the jury recommended against death, the facts justifying a death
sentence should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could disagree that
death was appropriate ....").
18. See Pennell v. State, 604 A.2d 1368, 1377-78 (Del. 1992).
19. Petitioner's Brief at n.16, Harris v. Alabama, (No. 93-7659), cert. granted, 63 U.S.L.W. 3024
(July 19, 1994).
20. See Martinez-Chavez v. State, 534 N.E.2d 731, 734 n.2 (ind. 1989).
21. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); see also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976)
(plurality opinion); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion).
22. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
23. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
19961
Journal of Legislation
and second, and the death penalty was usually only implemented for first degree mur-
der.
In phase two, roughly from the mid-nineteenth century to the 1970's, states used
the first degree murder definition to decide who was eligible for death, but left the
choice of imposing life or death to the unguided discretion of the judge or jury that
decided the guilt issue.24
Phase three began with the Furman decision when the Supreme Court held that
in the absence of judicial guidelines the application of the death penalty represents an
unconstitutional infringement of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The five-
member majority filed separate concurring opinions, while the four-member minority
filed separate dissenting opinions.2"
The majority opinion held:
[Tihe imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.26
According to Justice Stewart, current death penalty schemes "allowed [the death sen-
tence] to be 'wantonly' and 'freakishly' imposed, and a death sentence offended the
eighth and fourteenth amendments when 'wantonly and freakishly applied."' 27 Justice
White said that current death penalty schemes provided "no meaningful basis for dis-
tinguishing the few cases in which [death] is imposed from the many cases in which it
was not."2 The Court's ruling reversed the judgment in Furman "insofar as it leaves
undisturbed the death sentence imposed, and the cases are remanded for further pro-
ceedings."'
"The Furman decision was splintered, and the fundamental premise that emerged
from the various opinions was that the death penalty could not be imposed under sen-
tencing schemes that granted untrammeled discretion to the sentencer and thereby
created a risk that the death penalty would be administered in an arbitrary and capri-
cious manner."'3 The Court's decision vacated over 600 death sentences of prisoners
awaiting execution, and invalidated all forty death penalty schemes then in exis-
tence.3'
24. See JOHN KAPLAN & ROBERT WEISBERG, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIAL 389 (2d ed.
1991).
25. Furman, 408 U.S. at 238; (For the Justices' opinions see (Douglas, J., concurring at 240-57);
(Brennan, J., concurring at 257-306); (Stewart, J., concurring at 306-10); (White, J., concurring at 310-
14); (Marshall, J., concurring at 314-74); (Burger, CJ., dissenting at 375-405); (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing at 405-14); (Powell, J., dissenting at 414-65); (Rehnquist, J., dissenting at 465-70)). See also
Widder, supra note 14, at 1347 n.31.
26. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40. See also Widder, supra note 14, at 1347.
27. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart J., concurring). See also Daniel Ross Harris, Capital Sen-
tencing After Walton v. Arizona: A Retreat from the "Death is Different" Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L.
REV. 1389, 1396 & n.35 (1991) [hereinafter Capital Sentencing].
28. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring). See also Widder, supra note 14, at 1347.
29. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40. See also Widder, supra note 14, at 1347.
30. Daryl Kessler, Eighth Amendment - Sentencer Discretion in Capital Sentencing Schemes, 84 J.
CriM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 828 (1994).
31. See Capital Sentencing, supra note 27 at 1394.
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B. Post-Furman Death Penalty Schemes
After Furman, state legislatures scrambled to pass death sentencing schemes that
complied with the Court's ruling. At least thirty-five states enacted new death penalty
sentencing regulations by the time the Court returned to the issue. These newly adopt-
ed schemes generally followed one of two routes: (1) guided discretion schemes "spec-
ifying the factors to be weighed and the procedures to be followed in deciding when to
impose a capital sentence," or (2) mandatory schemes "[making] the death penalty
mandatory for specified crimes."32
In a group of five cases decided in 1976, the Court determined the constitutional-
ity of these two approaches. The Court struck down statutes that automatically imposed
the death penalty on the grounds that defendants were denied individualized determina-
tion of their sentences. 3 However, in Gregg,34 the Court upheld death penalty
schemes that guided the sentencer's discretion in determining an appropriate sentence,
explaining that:
[The] concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in an
arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures
that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance. As a
general proposition these concerns are best met by a system that provides for a
bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the infor-
mation relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide
its use of the information."
In Gregg, the Georgia legislature's reaction to Furman was to mandate a bifurcated
death penalty scheme with separate guilt and penalty phases. The "Gregg statutes"
further narrowed the class of people subject to the death penalty by specifying ten
statutory aggravating circumstances, one of which must be found to exist beyond a
reasonable doubt before a death sentence could be imposed.36 Additionally, the jury
was authorized to consider any other appropriate aggravating or mitigating circum-
stances. The jury was not required to find any mitigating factors to make a binding
recommendation of mercy, but it had to find at least one statutory aggravating circum-
stance before it could recommend death.37 The above procedures required a jury to
consider the circumstances of the crime and the criminal, as well as any special facts
about the defendant, before it could recommend a sentence of death.
32. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 180 & n.23 (1976) (plurality opinion).
33. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302-05 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333-36 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding mandatory death penalty
does not cure Furman's concern for jury's unbridled discretion and fails to afford particularized consid-
eration of defendant's record and character). See also Widder, supra note 14, at 1348 & n.38.
34. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207; see also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 260 (1976) (plurality
opinion); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276-77 (1976) (plurality opinion).
35. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195; See also Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274 (noting that Texas' procedure
"guides and focuses the jury's objective consideration of the particularized circumstances of the individ-
ual offense and the individual offender before it can impose a sentence of death"); Proffitt, 428 U.S.
at 258 (noting that Florida's statute ensures that "the trial court's sentencing discretion is guided and
channeled by a system that focuses on the circumstances of each individual homicide and individual
defendant in deciding whether the death penalty is imposed"). See also Widder, supra note 14, at 1348
& n.41.
36. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1990).
37. Id.
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An additional safeguard against arbitrary and capricious sentencing was provided
by an automatic appeal of all death sentences to the State's Supreme Court. The Geor-
gia Supreme Court was required to review each sentence and determine: (1) whether
the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion or prejudice, and (2) if the
evidence supports the finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance. Finally, the
Court had to determine the disproportionality of the death sentence imposed when
compared to other sentences imposed in similar circumstances.38
In Gregg, the Supreme Court found that limited discretion to impose a death
sentence was a valid way to avoid the arbitrariness and capriciousness condemned in
the pre-Furman sentencing schemes.39 The Court reasoned that decisions to impose
capital punishment should not be made under a system that creates a substantial risk of
prejudicial impulse, arbitrariness, or caprice.' This doctrine evolved into the principle
that "a capital sentencing scheme must 'genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible
for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe
sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder."' 4
C. Mitigating Factors-Lockett v. Ohio
A separate doctrine developed alongside the Court's command limiting
sentencer's discretion. This separate doctrine required the admission of all relevant
mitigating evidence and may be traced to the court's rationale in striking the post-
Furman mandatory sentencing schemes. The sentencer must be afforded the opportuni-
ty to consider mitigating circumstances to allow for "the possibility of compassionate
or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind."42 However,
this doctrine is generally attributed to Lockett v. Ohio.43
In Lockett the Court held that a defendant's minor role in a felony murder was a
mitigating factor that the sentencer was required to consider although it did not fall
within any enumerated statutory category." The Court commented:
[A] statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent
mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character and record and to circum-
stances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty
will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty. When
the choice is between life and death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible
with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.45
The Supreme Court ensured that the entire character and background of the defendant,
if relevant, should be considered in the sentencing decision when it decided Eddings v.
Oklahoma' in 1982.
38. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-98.
39. Id. at 198-207.
40. See Capital Sentencing, supra note 27, at 1401 & n.68.
41. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,
877 (1983)). See also Widder, supra note 14, at 1348 & n.42.
42. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion).
43. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion). See also Widder, supra note 14, at
1348-49.
44. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
45. Id. at 605.
46. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
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In Skipper v. South Carolina,47 the Court went even further when it reasoned
that since a defendant's record of disruptive or dangerous behavior in prison can be
considered as aggravating, "evidence that the defendant would not pose a danger if
spared (but incarcerated) must be considered potentially mitigating."'
These two complementary doctrines currently inform death penalty jurisprudence.
First, the legislature must provide sufficient standards to narrow the class of offenders
eligible to receive the death penalty; must "reasonably" justify the imposition of a
more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder, and
ensure that the discretion of the sentencing authority is limited and reviewable.49 Sec-
ond, the sentencer must be allowed to hear all relevant evidence in mitigation of a
sentence of death." It is these two doctrines and the idea that "[t]he State must ensure
that the process is neutral and principled so as to guard against bias or caprice in the
sentencing decision,"'" that will guide the Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. Ala-
bama.52
I. HARRIS v. ALABAMA
A. Factual History Of Harris v. Alabama
The petitioner was convicted of capital murder in the state of Alabama". The
victim, a deputy sheriff, was married to the petitioner. The petitioner was having an
affair with Lorenzo McCarter, and asked McCarter to find someone to kill her hus-
band. McCarter approached a co-worker, who refused and reported the solicitation to
his supervisor. However, McCarter subsequently found willing accomplices in Michael
Sockwell and Alex Hood, who were paid $100 along with a vague promise of more
money after performing the deed.
On the designated night, as the petitioner's husband left for work on the
nightshift, approximately 11:00 p.m., petitioner called McCarter on his beeper to alert
him. McCarter and Hood sat in a parked car across the street from the entrance to the
subdivision in which the petitioner and victim lived. Sockwell hid in the bushes next to
a stop sign at the entrance to the victims' subdivision. As the victim stopped his car at
the stop sign, Sockwell jumped forth and shot him, point blank, with a shotgun.54
The petitioner was arrested after questioning, and McCarter agreed to testify to
the conspiracy in exchange for a promise not to seek the death penalty.55 McCarter
testified that he was asked to kill the victim so that he and petitioner could share in the
victim's death benefits, a total of about $250,000.
47. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
48. Id. at 5 (referring to the defendant's record of good behavior in prison).
49. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion) ("Where the sentencing authority is
required to specify the factors it relied upon in reaching its decision, the further safeguard of meaning-
ful appellate review is available to ensure that death sentences are not imposed capriciously or in a
freakish manner.").
50. See Widder, supra note 14, at 1348.
51. See, e.g., Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2635 (1994). See also John W.
Guendelsberger, Judge Versus Jury: Can a Trial Judge Order Death When the Jury Recommends Life?
PREVIEW OF U.S. SUP. Cr. CASES, Nov. 14, 1994 at 113 (A.B.A. Div. for Public Ed.).
52. Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995).
53. Harris v. State, 632 So. 2d 503 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).
54. Id. at 508.
55. Id. at 532.
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A jury convicted the petitioner of capital murder, and at the sentencing hearing
several witnesses testified about the petitioner's good background and strong character.
The petitioner was raising seven children, held three simultaneous jobs, and participat-
ed actively in church.56 The jury recommended life without parole by a seven to five
vote.
The trial judge then considered the sentence and found the existence of one
statutory aggravating circumstance, murder for pecuniary gain, and one mitigating
circumstance, no prior criminal record. The trial judge also found as nonstatutory miti-
gating circumstances that the petitioner was a hardworking, respected member of the
community and the church. Noting that the petitioner planned the crime, financed its
commission, and stood to the most from the victim's murder, the judge concluded that
the one statutory aggravating factor far outweighed the nonstatutory mitigating factors.
Hence, the judge sentenced the petitioner to death.
In separate proceedings the other co-conspirators were convicted of capital mur-
der. McCarter and Hood received sentences of life without parole." Sockwell, the
triggerman, received a sentence of death after the trial judge rejected a seven to five
jury recommendation of life imprisonment. 8
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed petitioner's sentence,59 noting
that Alabama's death penalty scheme is based on Florida's sentencing scheme which
was held constitutional by the Supreme Court.' However, jury recommendations re-
ceive "great weight" from judges in Florida,6 while Alabama only requires that judg-
es "consider" the jury's advisory verdict.
The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the petitioner's contention that Florida's
"Tedder standard" is a constitutional requirement.62 Following the Alabama statute,
the Court then reviewed the record for prejudicial errors, and independently weighed
the aggravating and mitigating factors.63 The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the
sentence.'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether Alabama's death sen-
tencing scheme is unconstitutional because it does not specify the weight judges must
give a jury's sentencing recommendation, thus allowing arbitrary imposition of a death
sentence. 65
B. Supreme Court Decision In Harris
In Harris v. Alabama, the Supreme Court decided in an eight to one majority
opinion to affirm the petitioner's death sentence.' The Court's opinion was decided
along two themes: (1) the fact that the Court has spoken favorably of Florida's
"Tedder standard"'67 does not mean that it is a constitutional requirement,' and (2)
56. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1033.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1033-34.
59. Harris v. State, 632 So. 2d 503, 542-43 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).
60. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 457-67 (1984); see also Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242 (1976) (plurality opinion).
61. Tedder, 322 So. 2d at 910.
62. Harris v. State, 632 So. 2d 503, 538 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).
63. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53 (1994).
64. Ex parte Harris, 632 So. 2d 543 (Ala. 1993).
65. Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1031-32 (1995).
66. Id. at 1031.
67. "[Tlhe facts suggesting a sentence of death [are] so clear and convincing that virtually no
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that the Court has "rejected the notion that 'a specific method for balancing mitigating
and aggravating factors in a capital sentencing proceeding is constitutionally re-
quired."'
1. "Tedder Standard" Not a Constitutional Requirement
Alabama's death sentencing scheme is a trifurcated system similar to that of
Florida. Both states have instituted procedural safeguards that are recognized by the
Supreme Court. Both states require jury participation in the process, but give ultimate
sentencing authority to the trial judge. Furthermore, a death sentence in both states is
automatically subject to appellate review. ° Finally, the reviewing courts must both
independently weigh aggravating and mitigating factors to determine the propriety of
the sentence,7 and must also decide if the penalty is excessive or disproportionate
when compared to similar cases.72
The petitioner's main contention is that the two states, Florida and Alabama,
differ in one very important aspect of constitutional dimension. The Florida Supreme
Court requires that a trial judge give "great weight" to a jury's recommended sentence.
In Florida, a judge may not override an advisory verdict of life imprisonment unless
"the facts suggesting a sentence of death [are] so clear and convincing that virtually no
reasonable person could differ."'73 The same standard applies when overriding a jury
recommendation of death.74 However, Alabama's sentencing scheme only requires
that a judge "consider" the jury's recommendation,7" and Alabama courts have re-
fused to read the "Tedder standard" into their sentencing scheme.7"
The different deference accorded the jury's sentencing determination in the Ala-
bama and Florida death sentencing schemes is the basis for the controversy in Har-
ris.' The question before the Supreme Court was whether the Eighth Amendment re-
quires a sentencing judge to assign any particular weight to an advisory jury ver-
dict?
7
The Supreme Court held that Florida's death sentencing scheme was constitution-
al in Proffitt v. Florida.9 Later, in Spaziano v. Florida, the Court addressed the spe-
cific question of whether relegating a jury to an advisory role in a death sentencing
scheme and vesting the final sentencing authority in the judge was constitutional.'"
The Court acknowledged that sentencing power resided with the jury in most states.
reasonable person could differ." Tedder, 322 So. 2d at 910; see also Martinez-Chavez, 534 N.E.2d at
735 ("In order to sentence a defendant to death after the jury recommended against death, the facts
justifying a death sentence should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could
disagree that death was appropriate.
68. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1035.
69. Id. at 1035-36. See also Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179 (1988).
70. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-47(e), 13A-5-55 (1994); FLA. STAT. ch. 921.141 (3), (4) (1994). -
71. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53(b) (2) (1994); Harvard v. State, 375 So. 2d 833, 834 (Fla. 1977).
72. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53(b)(3) (1994); Williams v. State, 437 So. 2d 133, 136 (Fla. 1983).
73. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975); see also Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1034 (quot-
ing Tedder, 322 So. 2d at 910).
74. See Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d 833, 839 n.l (Fla. 1988).
75. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (1994).
76. Ex parte Jones, 456 So. 2d 380, 382-83 (Ala. 1984); see also Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1034.
77. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1031.
78. Id. at 1034.
79. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
80. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459-64 (1984).
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However, the Court also made it clear that the "Eighth Amendment is not violated
every time a State reaches a conclusion different from a majority of its sisters over
how best to administer its criminal laws."'" The Court spoke favorably about the def-
erence a judge in Florida must accord the jury's advisory verdict. 2 The Court was
also satisfied that the Florida Supreme Court takes the "Tedder standard" seriously; the
Florida Supreme Court does not hesitate to reverse a trial court if the jury's role is
diminished. 3
These favorable comments by the Court did not mean that the "Tedder standard"
is a constitutional requirement. The Court stated in Spaziano: "Our responsibility,
however, is not to second-guess the deference accorded the jury's recommendation in a
particular case, but to ensure that the result of the process is not arbitrary or discrimi-
natory." '84 The Supreme Court has made it clear that there is "not" just one correct
way for a state to set up its death penalty scheme." Despite the Court's praise for the
"Tedder standard," the key to analysis in cases in which the judge overrides a jury
advisory verdict is not the particular weight given a jury's advice, "but whether the
[sentencing] scheme adequately channels the sentencer's discretion so as to prevent
arbitrary results." 6
In Harris," the petitioner did not challenge Alabama's legislative choice to
guide the sentencing decision by requiring both jury and judge to weigh aggravating
and mitigating factors. Petitioner also did not object to the vesting of sentencing au-
thority in the judge, or the requirement that the jury's advisory verdict be considered in
the process. What petitioner sought from the Supreme Court was a "constitutional
mandate" on what weight a judge should accord a jury's sentencing recommendation.
Referring to the "Tedder standard," petitioner in Harris contended that the judge must
give "great weight" to a jury's advisory verdict."
2. Specific Method for Weighing Sentencing Factors Not a Constitutional Re-
quirement
In Harris, the Supreme Court rejected petitioner's argument that a specific meth-
od for balancing aggravating and mitigating factors in a death penalty scheme is a
constitutional requirement. The Court also rejected the idea that any specific weight
should be given to particular factors, either in aggravation or mitigation, when consid-
ering a death sentence. 9 Petitioner in Harris argued that in Alabama, a jury's verdict
is really much more than an advisory verdict and, in fact, actually commands the key
sentencing role, subject only to review by the judge. To support the argument, petition-
81. Id. at 464. See also Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1035.
82. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 249; see also Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 465-66 (quoting Dobbert v. Florida,
432 U.S. 282, 294-95 (1977)).
83. Spaziano, 428 U.S. at 465. See also Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1034-35.
84. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 465.
85. Id. at 464. See also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984); Zant, 462 U.S. at 884; Gregg, 428
U.S. at 195; Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1035.
86. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1035.
87. Id. at 1031.
88. Id. at 1035-36.
89. Id. See also Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179 (1988); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,
875 n.13 (1983).
90. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1036. See also Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1990);
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-15 (1982); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 267-68.
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er pointed to several Alabama cases that reversed death sentences when prejudicial
errors were committed before an advisory jury.9'
In reply the Supreme Court stated: "If the judge must consider the jury verdict in
sentencing a capital defendant, as the statute plainly requires, then it follows that a
sentence is invalid if the recommendation upon which it partially rests was rendered
erroneously." '92
Error is committed if the jury considers an invalid factor and its verdict is con-
sidered in turn by the judge: "This kind of indirect weighing of an invalid aggra-
vating factor creates the same potential for arbitrariness as the direct weighing of
an invalid aggravating factor," and the result, therefore, was error."94
The Court held that such consequential error attaches whenever a jury recom-
mendation is considered in a death penalty scheme, not only when it is given "great
weight" by a judge.95
The petitioner in Harris also pointed out that "inconsistent weight" was accorded
jury recommendations by trial court judges in numerous Alabama death sentencing
cases." For example, the trial judge in this case did not specify his reason for reject-
ing the jury's advice, but in another case stated that he gave "great weight" to the
jury's recommendation.97 Other judges, when rejecting jury recommendations of life
imprisonment have commented that there was a "reasonable basis" to do so;"8 that the
verdict was "unquestionably a bizarre result; 9 and that "if this were not a proper
case for the death penalty to be imposed, a proper case could scarcely be imag-
ined." °
Using the above examples, the petitioner in Harris argued that the Alabama
statute allowed arbitrary rejection of the jury's advisory verdict by judges. Petitioner
maintained that this arbitrary rejection by the judges goes directly against the Court's
mandate in Furman."' In Furman, 2 the Court stated that the death penalty could
not be imposed under sentencing schemes that granted untrammeled discretion to the
sentencer and thereby create a risk that the death penalty could be administered in an
arbitrary and capricious manner. °3
The Supreme Court, in affirming the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court in
Harris, replied that these divergent statements do not show any differing understanding
of the statutory requirement that jury verdicts be considered in death penalty cases.
They merely illustrate how different judges have considered the jury's advisory verdict.
91. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1036; See also Ex parte Williams, 556 So. 2d 744, 745 (Ala. 1987).
92. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1036.
93. Cf. Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 382 (1985).
94. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1036 (quoting Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 1082 (1992)).
95. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1036.
96. Id. at 1036-37.
97. Id. See also Coral v. State, 628 So. 2d 988 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (see Appendix at end of
the case for sentencing order of the trial court judge).
98. Parker v. State, 610 So. 2d 1171 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (see Appendix I at the end of the
case for the sentencing order of the trial court judge).
99. Ex parte Hays, 518 So. 2d 768, 777 (Ala. 1986).
100. State v. Frazier, No. CC-85-3291 (Mobile Cty., July 31, 1990) (Ala. sentencing order, p. 139).
101. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1036-37.
102. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
103. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). See also Daryl Kessler, Note, Eighth Amendment -
Sentencer Discretion in Capital Sentencing Schemes, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 828 (1994).
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The Court stated that uniform treatment of jury advisory verdicts is not constitutionally
mandated.'04
The Alabama statute provides that "[tihe process of weighing the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances to determine the sentence shall not be defined to mean a
mere tallying of aggravating and mitigating circumstances for the purpose of numerical
comparison."' 5 According to the Harris court, this is no less than what the Constitu-
tion requires." "[D]isparate treatment of jury [advisory] verdicts simply reflects the
fact that ... emphasis given to decisional criterion must, of necessity, vary in order to
account for the particular circumstances of each case.""'' As stated in Eddings v.
Oklahoma,'8 "[A] consistency produced by ignoring individual differences is a false
consistency.""'° The Court further pointed out that "[iun any event, [petitioner] [did]
not show how the various disparate statements affected her [particular] case. [Petition-
er] did not bring an equal protection claim, [nor did petitioner] contest the lower
court's conclusion that her sentence [was] proportionate to [those] imposed in similar
cases."" 0 The Court decided that sentiments expressed in unrelated cases do not ren-
der petitioner's punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.
The Supreme Court reasoned in support of its holding:
The Constitution permits the trial judge, acting alone, to impose a capital sentence.
It is thus not offended when a State further requires the sentencing judge to consid-
er a jury's recommendation and trusts the judge to give it the proper weight."'
C. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Stevens
1. Death Is Different
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, pointed out that a death penalty is fundamentally
different from any other penalty that society may impose. This difference is manifested
by state legislatures' assignments of sentencing authority. In every state except Oklaho-
ma, the trial judge and not the jury is responsible for sentencing in noncapital cas-
es."' In 33 of the 37 states that authorize the death penalty, the jury participates in
the sentencing decision. In 29 of these states the jury's decision is final. In the other
four states: Alabama,"3 Delaware," 4 Florida,"' and Indiana," 6 the judge has the
power to override the jury. 17 Florida, Indiana, and Delaware use the "Tedder stan-
dard" for jury overrides." 8 However, Alabama has no standard for a judge's over-
104. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1037.
105. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-48 (1994).
106. Harris, 115 S. CL at 1037. See also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258 (1976).
107. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1037.
108. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). See also Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1037.
109. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112.
110. Harris, 115 S. CL at 1037.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1038 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47 (1994).
114. DEL. CODE ANN. tiL 11, § 4209 (Supp 1992).
115. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 921.141 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995).
116. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (West Supp. 1994).
117. See Kathryn K. Russell, The Constitutionality of Jury Override in Alabama Death Penalty
'Cases, 46 ALA. L. REv. 5, 6, 9-10 (1994) (hereinafter Russell). See also Harris, 115 S.Ct. at 1037-38.
118. "IT]he facts suggesting a sentence of death [are] so clear and convincing that virtually no
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ride, which leaves open the possibility of an arbitrary and capricious judgement by the
judge.
2. Political Pressures Can Influence Sentencing Decisions
Justice Stevens believes that total reliance on judges to pronounce sentences of
death is constitutionally unacceptable." 9 An advisory jury recommendation may ame-
liorate concerns about judicial sentencing in some cases; more often than not, however,
that addition makes the scheme much worse, especially in Alabama, where the jury's
verdict carries no weight. 2 Because of political pressures, Alabama judges who face
partisan election every six years, are more likely to impose a death sentence. 2 '
Justice Stevens in a quote from Duncan v. Louisiana' wrote:
The Framers of our Constitution "knew from history and experience that it was




[T]he 'higher authority' to whom present-day capital judges may be 'too
responsive' is a political climate in which judges who covet higher office--or who
merely wish to remain judges-must constantly profess their fealty to the death
penalty.
24
Justice Stevens writes that the jury system provides reliable insulation against the pas-
sions of the polity. "Voting for a political candidate who vows to be 'tough on crime'
differs vastly from voting at the conclusion of an actual trial to condemn a specific
individual to death.', 25 A jury focuses its attention on a particular case that involves
the fate of a fellow citizen. This process is totally different than focusing on a general
remedy for a global category of faceless violent criminals who may appear unworthy
of life in the abstract. Justice Stevens stated that a jury's verdict is the expression of a
collective judgement that "we may fairly presume to reflect the considered view of the
community. '
According to Justice Stevens, community participation in life or death sentencing
decisions is just as critical as in those decisions that are expressly guaranteed a jury
trial by the constitution.2 7 As explained in Duncan:
The jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundamen-
tal decision about the exercise of official power-a reluctance to entrust plenary
reasonable person could differ." Tedder, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975); see also Martinez-Chavez v.
State, 534 N.E.2d 731, 735 (Ind. 1989) ("In order to sentence a defendant to death after the jury
recommended against death, the facts justifying a death sentence should be so clear and convincing
that virtually no reasonable person could disagree that death was appropriate .... ).
119. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 708 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Harris, 115
S. Ct. at 1039.
120. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1036, 1039-40.
121. Id. at 1039-40, n.8.
122. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
123. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156. See also Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1039.
124. Harris, 115 S. C. at 1039.
125. Id. at 1038-39.
126. Id. at 1039.
127. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI & VII.
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powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges.
Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other
respects, found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community
participation in the determination of guilt or innocence. '
Death sentences imposed against a jury recommendation of life imprisonment "sever
the critical 'link between contemporary community values and the penal system .... '
[and] [tihey result in execution of individuals whom the community would spare."'29
Judicial override of a jury's death sentence recommendation not only countermands the
community's judgment; it expresses "contempt" for that judgment.3
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
At first glance it seems that the Supreme Court in reaching its decision in Har-
ris,' overwhelmingly approves of the Alabama sentencing scheme. However, a clos-
er reading of the decision leads one to reach the opposite conclusion.
A. Statistical Anomaly in Results of Alabama's Death Penalty Scheme
The Court observed that, in the Florida context, permitting a trial judge to reject
a jury's recommendation may afford capital defendants "a second chance for life with
the trial judge."'32 However, in Alabama the sentencing scheme yielded some surpris-
ing statistics; there have been only five cases where a judge in Alabama rejected a
jury's death recommendation, compared to 47 cases where a judge imposed a death
sentence over a jury's recommendation of life imprisonment.33 The Court brushed
over this anomaly by saying that the numbers do not tell the whole story:
We do not know for instance, how many cases in which a jury recommendation of
life imprisonment is adopted would have ended differently had the judge not been
required to consider the jury's advice. Without such a subjective look into the
minds of the decisionmakers, the deceptively objective numbers afford at best an
incomplete picture. Even assuming that these statistics reflect a true view of capital
sentencing in Alabama, they say little about whether the scheme is constitutional.
That question turns not solely on a numerical tabulation of actual death sentences
as compared to a hypothetical alternative, but rather on whether the penalties im-
posed are the product of properly guided discretion and not of arbitrary whim."
B. The Problem With Alabama's Death Penalty Scheme
The fact that Alabama trial judges have overridden nine jury's life recommenda-
tions for every vetoed death recommendation is disturbing.'35 If the statistics are cor-
rect, there is a problem with Alabama's death penalty scheme.'36 While the problem
128. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
129. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1040-41 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519, n.15
(1968)).
130. Harris, 115 S. CL at 1041.
131. Id. at 1031.
132. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 296 (1977). See also Harris, 115 S. CL at 1036.
133. Harris, 115 S. CL at 1036 (statistics compiled by the Alabama Prison Project (Nov. 29, 1994)
filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court).
134. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1036.
135. Id. at 1040-41.
136. Id. at 1032.
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is not major, it can still be viewed as a crack in the protection afforded by Furman,
Gregg and their progeny. The people of Alabama, who face the death penalty, are
entitled to the full protection afforded by the Eighth Amendment.
As pointed out in Gregg:
[T]he Eighth Amendment has not been regarded as a static concept. As Mr. Chief
Justice Warren said, in an often quoted phrase, "[tihe Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society." Thus, an assessment of contemporary values concerning the infliction
of a challenged sanction is relevant to the application of the Eighth
Amendment .... [T]his assessment does not call for a subjective judgment. It
requires, rather, that we look to objective indicia that reflect the public attitude
toward a given sanction." 7
The evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society, is the
fact that every state with a death penalty scheme in place requires a norm or standard
for limiting the sentencer's discretion when imposing a death penalty. Only in Ala-
bama, does a trial judge when rejecting a jury advisory verdict not rely on any stan-
dard or norm, and is not required to articulate any reason for that override. This raises
a question as to the propriety of Alabama's death penalty scheme in light of the objec-
tive criteria that reflect that standard. 38
Because Alabama's death sentencing scheme does not call for an articulable
standard when overriding a jury recommendation we have no way of knowing why the
statistical anomaly occurred: (1) is it because the Alabama death penalty scheme so
narrows the class of people eligible for death that the majority of defendants truly
deserve death more than they deserve life imprisonment or (2) is it because of preju-
dice, arbitrariness, or caprice on the part of the judge? The list of suppositions is al-
most endless, and the only way to resolve these disturbing questions is by the "simple
expedient" of requiring the judge to articulate a standard when overriding a jury rec-
ommendation.'39
This "simple expedient" not only resolves any questions of impropriety on the
part of the trial judge, but also facilitates appellate review of the sentence. The appel-
late court will have concrete determinations by the judge which will allow easier anal-
ysis of the propriety of the sentence imposed.
C. The Opportunity for Self-Correction
The Court in Harris seems to be giving the state of Alabama an opportunity to
correct the problem discovered while reviewing the statistical data concerning the
application of its death penalty scheme."4 The Court stated:
If the Alabama statute indeed has not had the effect that we or its drafters had
anticipated, such unintended results would be of little constitutional consequence.
137. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 172-73 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opin-
ion)).
138. The objective criteria is the reality of what is being done to limit discretion in similar death
penalty schemes by Alabama's sister states.
139. There are other alternatives to this one and they will be discussed infra.
140. Harris, 115 S. CL at 1036.
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An ineffectual law is for the State legislature to amend, not for us to annul. 4'
Although not of constitutional magnitude, the problem is still a distinct chink in the
armor of the Furman and Gregg decisions. I believe that if the Alabama legislature
does not take the opportunity given by the Court to correct the apparent flaw in its
death penalty scheme; the Court might not hesitate to mandate a solution to the prob-
lem in the future, if given another opportunity.
This is not the first time that the Court has given the states an opportunity to
self-correct a problem involving death penalty schemes before acting on its own. In
McGautha v. California,42 the Court seemed to hint that if the states did not move to
correct the problems with their death penalty schemes, the Court would step in and
mandate a solution. One year later, the Court decided Furman'43 and invalidated all
death penalty schemes then in existence as violative of the Eighth Amendment.
D. Alternative Solutions
Adopting the Tedder standard'" is not the only solution to Alabama's problem.
The Alabama legislature could amend the Tedder standard to require only a reasonable
basis for a judge's override. The legislature could mandate a two-part Tedder standard:
(1) accord the jury's advisory verdict a presumptive weight, and (2) where the facts
suggesting a death sentence are so clear and convincing so that no reasonable person
could differ, the trial judge could override the jury's verdict. 45
Beyond Tedder, an Alabama sentencing jury could make written findings of
aggravating and mitigating factors, which along with its votes would provide the trial
judge with a definite starting point to evaluate the jury's verdict. With this information
the judge, in light of his or her experience, along with information that might not have
been made available to the jury (i.e., a defendant's pre-sentencing investigation report),
could more fairly decide if an override is proper." Furthermore, the judge's written
findings, along with the jury's, would provide greater guidance to the appellate court's
review of whether the trial court's override was fair, consistent, and in accord with the
mandates of the Furman and Gregg decisions.
The Alabama legislature has many options open to it to revise the now
standardless procedure for jury override in its death penalty scheme. 47 Surely Ala-
bama will heed the clarion call and amend the procedure.
141. Id.
142. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
143. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
144. "[Tlhe facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually
no reasonable person could differ." Tedder, 322 So. 2d at 910; see also Martinez-Chavez, 534 N.E. 2d
at 735 ("In order to sentence a defendant to death after the jury recommended against death, the facts
justifying a death sentence should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could
disagree that death was appropriate .... " ).
145. Russell, supra note 117, at 41.
146. Id.




The Supreme Court in upholding the Alabama death penalty scheme in Harris
posited:
The Constitution permits the trial judge, acting alone, to impose a capital sentence.
It [the Constitution] is thus not offended when a State further requires the sentenc-
ing judge to consider a jury's recommendation and trusts the judge to give it the
proper weight."
By this ruling the Court affirmed its prior commitment to, and concerns about, feder-
alism, state autonomy, and the growing power of the federal government. The Court
made the following very clear: (1) there is "not" only one correct way for a state to set
up its death penalty scheme;49 (2) a specific method for balancing mitigating and
aggravating factors in a death penalty scheme is "not" a constitutional requirement.' 5
Finally, the idea that any specific weight should be given to particular factors, either in
aggravation or mitigation, when considering a death sentence, was rejected. 5 '
In the final analysis the Court found that in today's society the overriding con-
cern of the Eighth Amendment is that a state's death penalty scheme adequately chan-
nels the sentencer's discretion so as to prevent arbitrary results.'52 Although the Court
found some disturbing statistics concerning the application of Alabama's death penalty
scheme, the Court left open the opportunity for the Alabama legislature to correct the
problem by itself.'..
It might seem that the Court's decision in Harris'" flies in the face of the
mandates of Furman' and Gregg.'56 However, this "crack in the armor" of
Furman and Gregg can be easily corrected by the Alabama legislature. The Supreme
Court seems to be giving Alabama an opportunity for self-correction. If the Alabama
legislature fails to correct the problem in the near future, and the Supreme Court does
not correct the problem, if given another opportunity to do so; the Harris decision
could mark the beginning of a "fourth phase" concerning the death penalty in Ameri-
ca. "'7 This "fourth phase" could manifest itself as a "loosening up" of the mandates
of the Furman and Gregg decisions as a result of the recent public demand for tougher
attitudes toward crime.
Abe Mualiem
148. Han-is, 115 S. Ct at 1037.
149. Id. at 1034-35. See also Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 464; Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984);
Zant, 462 U.S. at 884; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195.
150. Id. at 1035-36. See also Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179 (1988); Zant, 462 U.S. at
875 n.13.
151. Id. See also Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1990); Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 113-15 (1982); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 267-68 (1976).
152. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1032. See also Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 465.
153. Harris, 115 S. Ct. at 1036.
154. Id. at 1031.
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428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion).
157. See supra section H A of this note.
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